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# Copyright 2017, 2020-2021 Russ Allbery <eagle@eyrie.org>
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-clause or GPL-1+

format: v1

name: pam-krb5
maintainer: Russ Allbery <eagle@eyrie.org>
version: '4.11'
synopsis: PAM module for Kerberos authentication

license:
  name: BSD-3-clause-or-GPL-1+
copyrights:
  - holder: Russ Allbery <eagle@eyrie.org>
    years: 2005-2010, 2014-2015, 2017, 2020-2021
  - holder: The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
    years: 2009-2011
  - holder: Andres Salomon <dilinger@debian.org>
    years: '2005'
  - holder: Frank Cusack <fcusack@fcusack.com>
    years: 1999-2000

build:
  autoconf: '2.64'
  automake: '1.11'
  autotools: true
  kerberos: true
  manpages: true
  middle: |
    The module will be installed in `/usr/local/lib/security` by default, but
    expect to have to override this using `--libdir`.  The correct
    installation path for PAM modules varies considerably between systems.
    The module will always be installed in a subdirectory named `security`
    under the specified value of `--libdir`.  On Red Hat Linux, for example,
    `--libdir=/usr/lib64` is appropriate to install the module into the system
    PAM directory.  On Debian's amd64 architecture,
    `--libdir=/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu` would be correct.
  reduced_depends: true
  type: Autoconf
  valgrind: true
distribution:
  packaging:
    debian:
      package: libpam-krb5
      summary: |
        Debian packages are available from Debian in Debian 4.0 (etch) and
        later releases as libpam-krb5 and libpam-heimdal.  The former packages
        are built against the MIT Kerberos libraries and the latter against
        the Heimdal libraries.
  section: kerberos
  tarname: pam-krb5
  version: pam-krb5
support:
  email: eagle@eyrie.org
  github: rra/pam-krb5
  web: https://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/software/pam-krb5/
vcs:
  browse: https://git.eyrie.org/?p=kerberos/pam-krb5.git
  github: rra/pam-krb5
  openhub: https://www.openhub.net/p/pamkrb5
  status:
    workflow: build
  type: Git
  url: https://git.eyrie.org/git/kerberos/pam-krb5.git

quote:
  author: Joyce McGreevy
  date: 2003-11-17
  text: |
    "You're always going to have some people who can't appreciate the thrill
    of a tepid change for the somewhat better," explained one source.
  title: '"Look, ma, no hands!"'
  work: Salon
advisories:
  - date: 2020-03-30
    threshold: '4.9'
    versions: 4.8 and earlier
  - date: 2009-02-11
    threshold: '3.13'
    versions: 3.12 and earlier
docs:
  user:
    - name: pam-krb5
      title: Manual page
  developer:
    - name: todo
      title: To-do list

blurb: |
  pam-krb5 is a Kerberos PAM module for either MIT Kerberos or Heimdal.  It
  supports ticket refreshing by screen savers, configurable authorization
  handling, authentication of non-local accounts for network services,
  password changing, and password expiration, as well as all the standard
  expected PAM features.  It works correctly with OpenSSH, even with
  ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PrivilegeSeparation enabled, and
  supports extensive configuration either by PAM options or in krb5.conf or
  both.  PKINIT is supported with recent versions of both MIT Kerberos and
  Heimdal and FAST is supported with recent MIT Kerberos.

description: |
  pam-krb5 provides a Kerberos PAM module that supports authentication, user
  ticket cache handling, simple authorization (via .k5login or checking
  Kerberos principals against local usernames), and password changing.  It can
  be configured through either options in the PAM configuration itself or
  through entries in the system krb5.conf file, and it tries to work around
  PAM implementation flaws in commonly-used PAM-enabled applications such as
  OpenSSH and xdm.  It supports both PKINIT and FAST to the extent that the
  underlying Kerberos libraries support these features.

  This is not the Kerberos PAM module maintained on Sourceforge and used on
  Red Hat systems.  It is an independent implementation that, if it ever
  shared any common code, diverged long ago.  It supports some features that
  the Sourceforge module does not (particularly around authorization), and
  does not support some options (particularly ones not directly related to
  Kerberos) that it does.  This module will never support Kerberos v4 or AFS.
  For an AFS session module that works with this module (or any other Kerberos
  PAM module), see
  [pam-afs-session](https://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/software/pam-afs-session/).

  If there are other options besides AFS and Kerberos v4 support from the
  Sourceforge PAM module that you're missing in this module, please let me
  know.

requirements: |
  Either MIT Kerberos (or Kerberos implementations based on it) or Heimdal are
  supported.  MIT Keberos 1.3 or later may be required; this module has not
  been tested with earlier versions.

  For PKINIT support, Heimdal 0.8rc1 or later or MIT Kerberos 1.6.3 or later
  are required.  Earlier MIT Kerberos 1.6 releases have a bug in their
  handling of PKINIT options.  MIT Kerberos 1.12 or later is required to use
  the use_pkinit PAM option.

  For FAST (Flexible Authentication Secure Tunneling) support, MIT Kerberos
  1.7 or higher is required.  For anonymous FAST support, anonymous
  authentication (generally anonymous PKINIT) support is required in both the
  Kerberos libraries and in the local KDC.

  This module should work on Linux and build with gcc or clang.  It may still
  work on Solaris and build with the Sun C compiler, but I have only tested it
  on Linux recently.  There is beta-quality support for the AIX NAS Kerberos
  implementation that has not been tested in years.  Other PAM implementations
  will probably require some porting, although untested build system support
  is present for FreeBSD, Mac OS X, and HP-UX.  I personally can only test on
  Linux and rely on others to report problems on other operating systems.

  Old versions of OpenSSH are known to call `pam_authenticate` followed by
  `pam_setcred(PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED)` without first calling
  `pam_open_session`, thereby requesting that an existing ticket cache be
  renewed (similar to what a screensaver would want) rather than requesting a
  new ticket cache be created.  Since this behavior is indistinguishable at
  the PAM level from a screensaver, pam-krb5 when used with these old versions
  of OpenSSH will refresh the ticket cache of the OpenSSH daemon rather than
  setting up a new ticket cache for the user.  The resulting ticket cache will
  have the correct permissions (this is not a security concern), but will not
  be named correctly or referenced in the user's environment and will be
  overwritten by the next user login.  The best solution to this problem is to
  upgrade OpenSSH.  I'm not sure exactly when this problem was fixed, but at
  the very least OpenSSH 4.3 and later do not exhibit it.

test:
  lancaster: true
  prefix: |
    pam-krb5 comes with a comprehensive test suite, but it requires some
    configuration in order to test anything other than low-level utility
    functions.  For the full test suite, you will need to have a running KDC
    in which you can create two test accounts, one with admin access to the
    other.  Using a test KDC environment, if you have one, is recommended.

    Follow the instructions in `tests/config/README` to configure the test
    suite.

    Now, you can run the test suite with:
  suffix: |
    The default libkadm5clnt library on the system must match the
    implementation of your KDC for the module/expired test to work, since the
    two kadmin protocols are not compatible.  If you use the MIT library
    against a Heimdal server, the test will be skipped; if you use the Heimdal
    library against an MIT server, the test suite may hang.

    Several `module/expired` tests are expected to fail with Heimdal 1.5 due
    to a bug in Heimdal with reauthenticating immediately after a
    library-mediated password change of an expired password.  This is fixed in
    later releases of Heimdal.

    To run the full test suite, Perl 5.10 or later is required.  The following
    additional Perl modules will be used if present:

    * Test::Pod
    * Test::Spelling

    All are available on CPAN.  Those tests will be skipped if the modules are
    not available.

sections:
  - title: Configuring
    body: |
      Just installing the module does not enable it or change anything about
      your system authentication configuration.  To use the module for all
      system authentication on Debian systems, put something like:

      ```
          auth  sufficient   pam_krb5.so minimum_uid=1000
          auth  required     pam_unix.so try_first_pass nullok_secure
      ```

      in `/etc/pam.d/common-auth`, something like:

      ```
          session  optional  pam_krb5.so minimum_uid=1000
          session  required  pam_unix.so
      ```

      in `/etc/pam.d/common-session`, and something like:

      ```
          account  required  pam_krb5.so minimum_uid=1000
          account  required  pam_unix.so
      ```

      in `/etc/pam.d/common-account`.  The `minimum_uid` setting tells the PAM
      module to pass on any users with a UID lower than 1000, thereby
      bypassing Kerberos authentication for the root account and any system
      accounts.  You normally want to do this since otherwise, if the network
      is down, the Kerberos authentication can time out and make it difficult
      to log in as root and fix matters.  This also avoids problems with
      Kerberos principals that happen to match system accounts accidentally
      getting access to those accounts.

      Be sure to include the module in the session group as well as the auth
      group.  Without the session entry, the user's ticket cache will not be
      created properly for ssh logins (among possibly others).

      If your users should normally all use Kerberos passwords exclusively,
      putting something like:

      ```
          password sufficient pam_krb5.so minimum_uid=1000
          password required   pam_unix.so try_first_pass obscure md5
      ```

      in `/etc/pam.d/common-password` will change users' passwords in Kerberos
      by default and then only fall back on Unix if that doesn't work.  (You
      can make this tighter by using the more complex new-style PAM
      configuration.)  If you instead want to synchronize local and Kerberos
      passwords and change them both at the same time, you can do something
      like:

      ```
          password required   pam_unix.so obscure sha512
          password required   pam_krb5.so use_authtok minimum_uid=1000
      ```

      If you have multiple environments that you want to synchronize and you
      don't want password changes to continue if the Kerberos password change
      fails, use the `clear_on_fail` option.  For example:

      ```
          password required   pam_krb5.so clear_on_fail minimum_uid=1000
          password required   pam_unix.so use_authtok obscure sha512
          password required   pam_smbpass.so use_authtok
      ```

      In this case, if `pam_krb5` cannot change the password (due to password
      strength rules on the KDC, for example), it will clear the stored
      password (because of the `clear_on_fail` option), and since `pam_unix`
      and `pam_smbpass` are both configured with `use_authtok`, they will both
      fail.  `clear_on_fail` is not the default because it would interfere
      with the more common pattern of falling back to local passwords if the
      user doesn't exist in Kerberos.

      If you use a more complex configuration with the Linux PAM `[]` syntax
      for the session and account groups, note that `pam_krb5` returns a
      status of ignore, not success, if the user didn't log on with Kerberos.
      You may need to handle that explicitly with `ignore=ignore` in your
      action list.

      There are many, many other possibilities.  See the Linux PAM
      documentation for all the configuration options.

      On Red Hat systems, modify `/etc/pam.d/system-auth` instead, which
      contains all of the configuration for the different stacks.

      You can also use pam-krb5 only for specific services.  In that case,
      modify the files in `/etc/pam.d` for that particular service to use
      `pam_krb5.so` for authentication.  For services that are using passwords
      over TLS to authenticate users, you may want to use the `ignore_k5login`
      and `no_ccache` options to the authenticate module.  `.k5login`
      authorization is only meaningful for local accounts and ticket caches
      are usually (although not always) only useful for interactive sessions.

      Configuring the module for Solaris is both simpler and less flexible,
      since Solaris (at least Solaris 8 and 9, which are the last versions of
      Solaris with which this module was extensively tested) use a single
      `/etc/pam.conf` file that contains configuration for all programs.  For
      console login on Solaris, try something like:

      ```
          login auth sufficient /usr/local/lib/security/pam_krb5.so minimum_uid=100
          login auth required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix_auth.so.1 use_first_pass
          login account required /usr/local/lib/security/pam_krb5.so minimum_uid=100
          login account required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix_account.so.1
          login session required /usr/local/lib/security/pam_krb5.so retain_after_close minimum_uid=100
          login session required /usr/lib/security/pam_unix_session.so.1
      ```

      A similar configuration could be used for other services, such as ssh.
      See the pam.conf(5) man page for more information.  When using this
      module with Solaris login (at least on Solaris 8 and 9), you will
      probably also need to add `retain_after_close` to the PAM configuration
      to avoid having the user's credentials deleted before they are logged
      in.

      The Solaris Kerberos library reportedly does not support prompting for a
      password change of an expired account during authentication.  Supporting
      password change for expired accounts on Solaris with native Kerberos may
      therefore require setting the `defer_pwchange` or `force_pwchange`
      option for selected login applications.  See the description and
      warnings about that option in the pam_krb5(5) man page.

      Some configuration options may be put in the `krb5.conf` file used by
      your Kerberos libraries (usually `/etc/krb5.conf` or
      `/usr/local/etc/krb5.conf`) instead or in addition to the PAM
      configuration.  See the man page for more details.

      The Kerberos library, via pam-krb5, will prompt the user to change their
      password if their password is expired, but when using OpenSSH, this will
      only work when `ChallengeResponseAuthentication` is enabled.  Unless
      this option is enabled, OpenSSH doesn't pass PAM messages to the user
      and can only respond to a simple password prompt.

      If you are using MIT Kerberos, be aware that users whose passwords are
      expired will not be prompted to change their password unless the KDC
      configuration for your realm in `[realms]` in `krb5.conf` contains a
      `master_kdc` setting or, if using DNS SRV records, you have a DNS entry
      for `_kerberos-master` as well as `_kerberos`.
  - title: Debugging
    body: |
      The first step when debugging any problems with this module is to add
      `debug` to the PAM options for the module (either in the PAM
      configuration or in `krb5.conf`).  This will significantly increase the
      logging from the module and should provide a trace of exactly what
      failed and any available error information.

      Many Kerberos authentication problems are due to configuration issues in
      `krb5.conf`.  If pam-krb5 doesn't work, first check that `kinit` works
      on the same system.  That will test your basic Kerberos configuration.
      If the system has a keytab file installed that's readable by the process
      doing authentication via PAM, make sure that the keytab is current and
      contains a key for `host/<system>` where <system> is the fully-qualified
      hostname.  pam-krb5 prevents KDC spoofing by checking the user's
      credentials when possible, but this means that if a keytab is present it
      must be correct or authentication will fail.  You can check the keytab
      with `klist -k` and `kinit -k`.

      Be sure that all libraries and modules, including PAM modules, loaded by
      a program use the same Kerberos libraries.  Sometimes programs that use
      PAM, such as current versions of OpenSSH, also link against Kerberos
      directly.  If your sshd is linked against one set of Kerberos libraries
      and pam-krb5 is linked against a different set of Kerberos libraries,
      this will often cause problems (such as segmentation faults, bus errors,
      assertions, or other strange behavior).  Similar issues apply to the
      com_err library or any other library used by both modules and shared
      libraries and by the application that loads them.  If your OS ships
      Kerberos libraries, it's usually best if possible to build all Kerberos
      software on the system against those libraries.
  - title: Implementation Notes
    body: |
      The normal sequence of actions taken for a user login is:

      ```
          pam_authenticate
          pam_setcred(PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED)
          pam_open_session
          pam_acct_mgmt
      ```

      and then at logout:

      ```
          pam_close_session
      ```

      followed by closing the open PAM session.  The corresponding `pam_sm_*`
      functions in this module are called when an application calls those
      public interface functions.  Not all applications call all of those
      functions, or in particularly that order, although `pam_authenticate` is
      always first and has to be.

      When `pam_authenticate` is called, pam-krb5 creates a temporary ticket
      cache in `/tmp` and sets the PAM environment variable `PAM_KRB5CCNAME`
      to point to it.  This ticket cache will be automatically destroyed when
      the PAM session is closed and is there only to pass the initial
      credentials to the call to `pam_setcred`.  The module would use a memory
      cache, but memory caches will only work if the application preserves the
      PAM environment between the calls to `pam_authenticate` and
      `pam_setcred`.  Most do, but OpenSSH notoriously does not and calls
      `pam_authenticate` in a subprocess, so this method is used to pass the
      tickets to the `pam_setcred` call in a different process.

      `pam_authenticate` does a complete authentication, including checking
      the resulting TGT by obtaining a service ticket for the local host if
      possible, but this requires read access to the system keytab.  If the
      keytab doesn't exist, can't be read, or doesn't include the appropriate
      credentials, the default is to accept the authentication.  This can be
      controlled by setting `verify_ap_req_nofail` to true in `[libdefaults]`
      in `/etc/krb5.conf`.  `pam_authenticate` also does a basic authorization
      check, by default calling `krb5_kuserok` (which uses `~/.k5login` if
      available and falls back to checking that the principal corresponds to
      the account name).  This can be customized with several options
      documented in the pam_krb5(5) man page.

      pam-krb5 treats `pam_open_session` and `pam_setcred(PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED)`
      as synonymous, as some applications call one and some call the other.
      Both copy the initial credentials from the temporary cache into a
      permanent cache for this session and set `KRB5CCNAME` in the
      environment.  It will remember when the credential cache has been
      established and then avoid doing any duplicate work afterwards, since
      some applications call `pam_setcred` or `pam_open_session` multiple
      times (most notably X.Org 7 and earlier xdm, which also throws away the
      module settings the last time it calls them).

      `pam_acct_mgmt` finds the ticket cache, reads it in to obtain the
      authenticated principal, and then does is another authorization check
      against `.k5login` or the local account name as described above.

      After the call to `pam_setcred` or `pam_open_session`, the ticket cache
      will be destroyed whenever the calling application either destroys the
      PAM environment or calls `pam_close_session`, which it should do on user
      logout.

      The normal sequence of events when refreshing a ticket cache (such as
      inside a screensaver) is:

      ```
          pam_authenticate
          pam_setcred(PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED)
          pam_acct_mgmt
      ```

      (`PAM_REFRESH_CRED` may be used instead.)  Authentication proceeds as
      above.  At the `pam_setcred` stage, rather than creating a new ticket
      cache, the module instead finds the current ticket cache (from the
      `KRB5CCNAME` environment variable or the default ticket cache location
      from the Kerberos library) and then reinitializes it with the
      credentials from the temporary `pam_authenticate` ticket cache.  When
      refreshing a ticket cache, the application should not open a session.
      Calling `pam_acct_mgmt` is optional; pam-krb5 doesn't do anything
      different when it's called in this case.

      If `pam_authenticate` apparently didn't succeed, or if an account was
      configured to be ignored via `ignore_root` or `minimum_uid`,
      `pam_setcred` (and therefore `pam_open_session`) and `pam_acct_mgmt`
      return `PAM_IGNORE`, which tells the PAM library to proceed as if that
      module wasn't listed in the PAM configuration at all.
      `pam_authenticate`, however, returns failure in the ignored user case by
      default, since otherwise a configuration using `ignore_root` with
      pam-krb5 as the only PAM module would allow anyone to log in as root
      without a password.  There doesn't appear to be a case where returning
      `PAM_IGNORE` instead would improve the module's behavior, but if you
      know of a case, please let me know.

      By default, `pam_authenticate` intentionally does not follow the PAM
      standard for handling expired accounts and instead returns failure from
      `pam_authenticate` unless the Kerberos libraries are able to change the
      account password during authentication.  Too many applications either do
      not call `pam_acct_mgmt` or ignore its exit status.  The fully correct
      PAM behavior (returning success from `pam_authenticate` and
      `PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD` from `pam_acct_mgmt`) can be enabled with the
      `defer_pwchange` option.

      The `defer_pwchange` option is unfortunately somewhat tricky to
      implement.  In this case, the calling sequence is:

      ```
          pam_authenticate
          pam_acct_mgmt
          pam_chauthtok
          pam_setcred
          pam_open_session
      ```

      During the first `pam_authenticate`, we can't obtain credentials and
      therefore a ticket cache since the password is expired.  But
      `pam_authenticate` isn't called again after `pam_chauthtok`, so
      `pam_chauthtok` has to create a ticket cache.  We however don't want it
      to do this for the normal password change (`passwd`) case.

      What we do is set a flag in our PAM data structure saying that we're
      processing an expired password, and `pam_chauthtok`, if it sees that
      flag, redoes the authentication with password prompting disabled after
      it finishes changing the password.

      Unfortunately, when handling password changes this way, `pam_chauthtok`
      will always have to prompt the user for their current password again
      even though they just typed it.  This is because the saved
      authentication tokens are cleared after `pam_authenticate` returns, for
      security reasons.  We could hack around this by saving the password in
      our PAM data structure, but this would let the application gain access
      to it (exactly what the clearing is intended to prevent) and breaks a
      PAM library guarantee.  We could also work around this by having
      `pam_authenticate` get the `kadmin/changepw` authenticator in the
      expired password case and store it for `pam_chauthtok`, but it doesn't
      seem worth the hassle.
  - title: History and Acknowledgements
    body: |
      Originally written by Frank Cusack <fcusack@fcusack.com>, with the
      following acknowledgement:

      > Thanks to Naomaru Itoi <itoi@eecs.umich.edu>, Curtis King
      > <curtis.king@cul.ca>, and Derrick Brashear <shadow@dementia.org>, all
      > of whom have written and made available Kerberos 4/5 modules.
      > Although no code in this module is directly from these author's
      > modules, (except the get_user_info() routine in support.c; derived
      > from whichever of these authors originally wrote the first module the
      > other 2 copied from), it was extremely helpful to look over their code
      > which aided in my design.

      The module was then patched for the FreeBSD ports collection with
      additional modifications by unknown maintainers and then was modified by
      Joel Kociolek <joko@logidee.com> to be usable with Debian GNU/Linux.

      It was packaged by Sam Hartman as the Kerberos v5 PAM module for Debian
      and improved and modified by him and later by Russ Allbery to fix bugs
      and add additional features.  It was then adopted by Andres Salomon, who
      added support for refreshing credentials.

      The current distribution is maintained by Russ Allbery, who also added
      support for reading configuration from `krb5.conf`, added many features
      for compatibility with the Sourceforge module, commented and
      standardized the formatting of the code, and overhauled the
      documentation.

      Thanks to Douglas E. Engert for the initial implementation of PKINIT
      support.  I have since modified and reworked it extensively, so any bugs
      or compilation problems are my fault.

      Thanks to Markus Moeller for lots of debugging and multiple patches and
      suggestions for improved portability.

      Thanks to Booker Bense for the implementation of the `alt_auth_map`
      option.

      Thanks to Sam Hartman for the FAST support implementation.
